Polygon's validators have been asked to approve a one-time hard fork that would pull roughly 70.49 million POL out of five frozen attacker addresses and move it to recovery wallets controlled by پلی‌مارکت and Binance. The request, filed to the Polygon governance forum on November 4, 2026 by the validator-support team at Polygon Labs (the network's core developer) on behalf of both firms, is the first concrete plan to return coins stranded after two breaches late in October: a compromised script that drained پلی‌مارکت users on October 29, 2026, and a hot-wallet exploit at the exchange Binance the same day.

What makes it unusual is the tool, not the amount. POL, the native gas token of the Polygon proof-of-stake chain, has no central issuer who can reverse a transfer, so moving coins out of an address nobody holds the keys to means rewriting the ledger itself at the protocol level. That is a step a chain built on the promise of immutability almost never takes, and the proposal says so plainly, describing itself as "an extreme action that should not be reproduced commonly."

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How the fork would move the coins

The mechanism is narrow by design. At a fixed activation block, every Polygon node running the new software would read each listed address's balance from the chain's state, set it to zero, and credit the identical amount to a named recovery wallet. It touches only native POL, leaves the total token supply unchanged, and does all of it without the holders' private keys or signatures. Nothing else on the chain, and no other token, is affected.

The 70,489,329 POL is spread across five blocked addresses. Four are tied to the پلی‌مارکت incident and together hold about 23.86 million POL:

The fifth address, 0x5227...2f8c, is tied to Binance and holds about 46.63 million POL, more than the other four combined. The two recovery destinations named in the proposal are 0x3dcE...D952 for پلی‌مارکت and 0xd9fd...0b80 for Binance, and both firms must prove in writing that they control those wallets before the fork activates.

The two breaches behind the frozen coins

The پلی‌مارکت incident hit the platform's users directly. On October 29, 2026 a compromised third-party script rode users' active sessions to sell their positions and drain their wallets. پلی‌مارکت, the prediction-market platform where traders buy and sell contracts on real-world outcomes, restricted trading to cancel-only, reopened the same day, and pledged to refund affected users. Of roughly 28 million POL caught up in the attack, only about 23.86 million was still sitting on blocked addresses by the time Polygon's block producers reacted; the remaining 4 million or so had already moved and is beyond what the fork can recover.

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The Binance breach was larger in POL terms and came from inside the exchange. According to Binance's own incident report, an attacker exploited unauthorized access to an internal wallet-signing service. In a single block the exchange's hot wallet sent out 46,626,589.6 POL and 6,185,900.1 USDT. Tether, the company that issues the USDT stablecoin, froze the stolen USDT, which is exactly why the fork covers only the native POL that no issuer can touch.

Why freezing the addresses was not enough

At both firms' request, Polygon's block producers had already added the attacker addresses to the Bor transaction block list, a startup-loaded filter in the Bor block-producer software that refuses to include listed addresses' transactions. That stopped the coins from moving, but the proposal is blunt about the limit: a block list freezes funds in place and offers no way to return them. Left alone, the POL would sit on the attacker's addresses indefinitely. The fork is framed as the only mechanism that actually reverses the theft rather than just containing it.

The attacker is still trying to get the money out

The proposal points to the attacker's own behavior as part of the justification. A transaction sat pending that offered validators a fee of about 219,450 POL (worth roughly $20,000 at the October 29 price) to push it through, and the proposal describes an alleged cash offer made to validators to pass a transaction moving the blocked funds. The coins are frozen but under active pressure, with someone willing to pay to find a single block producer who will break ranks. پلی‌مارکت says it also offered the attacker a whitehat return channel through SEAL Safe Harbor, a framework that lets a hacker give funds back under agreed terms with legal protection, and got no reply.

What still has to happen

None of this is live yet. As of November 6, 2026 the plan still needs a governance vote, a rehearsal on Amoy (Polygon's public test network, where the balance reassignment would be run before any real coins move), and a mainnet activation block, and none of those were set. The proposal was presented at the Polygon Protocol Governance Call on November 5, 2026 at 14:30 UTC. Polygon Labs' validator-relations team put roughly two weeks forward as a workable window for client development and the Amoy rehearsal, and said it expects 70% to 80% of staked validators to upgrade quickly. A hard fork only takes effect if a large enough share of stake runs the new code at the chosen block, so that percentage is the whole game.

A dollar figure that keeps moving

Coverage has put the frozen POL's value anywhere from about $6.5 million to $7 million, and the spread is not a disagreement about how many coins are involved. Everyone agrees on roughly 70.49 million POL. The dollar number drifts only because POL's price moves: the proposal used $0.0924, the price on October 29, for a figure near $6.5 million, while a November 4 snapshot put it closer to $6.8 million. The coin count is the fact; the dollar tag is just a timestamp.

Rewriting balances by vote

The deeper stake is precedent. Polygon is asking its validators to override the ledger's immutability on purpose, editing balances that no private key authorized, and to agree that this is acceptable because the alternative is letting a thief keep stolen user money. The "extreme action that should not be reproduced commonly" line is a guardrail written into the request itself, an attempt to make the exception explicit so it does not quietly become a tool. For traders holding positions on پلی‌مارکت, the practical question is narrower: whether recovered POL actually reaches the users who were drained, and how much of the roughly 28 million POL from that incident is gone for good.

For now the 70.49 million POL sits exactly where the attacker left it, frozen but not returned, while Polygon's validators decide whether writing a new balance into the ledger by vote is a rescue or a precedent they will regret. The coins move only if at least 70% of staked validators run software that does not exist yet, at a block that has not been chosen, and only after پلی‌مارکت and Binance prove in writing that the recovery wallets are theirs. Until then the most telling number on Polygon is not POL's price. It is how many validators are willing to break their own immutability to give it back.