Kaspersky's Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT), the threat-intelligence unit of the security firm, has concluded that two of late October's biggest crypto incidents came from opposite weak points: an outside web component bolted onto one platform, and a staff laptop inside another. The breach of Polymarket, the crypto-based prediction-market platform, on October 29, 2026 ran through a hijacked third-party monitoring script, while the exchange Binance lost an estimated $6.3 billion, the largest crypto theft on record, after attackers reached an internal service container through a compromised engineer's machine.
For prediction-market traders, the Polymarket case is the sharper warning, even though Binance owns the headline number. Polymarket has pledged roughly $3.9 million in refunds after attackers used a trusted piece of code the company did not write to sell users' open positions and move the proceeds out. Georgy Kucherin, a senior researcher on the GReAT team, says the two events are textbook versions of the two ways crypto money gets stolen, and that neither has been pinned on a specific group yet.
How the Polymarket drain actually worked
The attack did not crack Polymarket's own systems. It rode in on DebugBear, a third-party website-monitoring vendor whose real-user-monitoring script (a small piece of code embedded on a site to measure how pages load for actual visitors) was running on Polymarket's front end. Once that script was compromised, it abused traders' active browser sessions to sell their open positions and push the funds out, acting with the authority the logged-in user had already granted the page.
DebugBear traces the compromise to its own domain registrar. Its DNS records, the settings that point a web address to the correct servers, were hijacked, which let attackers serve a malicious version of the script to a single targeted customer. About $2.7 million was taken directly from 726 wallets.
What Polymarket is paying back
Polymarket's roughly $3.9 million pledge breaks into two parts:
- $2.7 million to cover funds stolen outright from the 726 drained wallets.
- $1.19 million to compensate about 5,500 wallets for losses tied to the trading halt and the forced sales that followed it.
By October 30, 2026, 689 of the 726 directly drained wallets had been made whole, with 37 still pending. Reporting on the incident notes that this is the second time in roughly four months that a third-party script has been the way in, after an earlier compromise surfaced in June 2026.
The Binance side, and the bigger number
Binance, the world's largest crypto exchange, disclosed its own breach on October 30, 2026, a day after the Polymarket drain. Its first investigation pointed to a compromised DevOps engineer's laptop that opened the way to a service container, an isolated software environment used to run internal processes, from which attackers submitted unauthorized withdrawals. The exchange put the loss at about $6.3 billion, suspended deposits and withdrawals, said it found no evidence that any wallet's private key had leaked, and pledged to cover user losses. Roughly $3 billion has been frozen on-chain, and withdrawals resumed around November 1, 2026.
That account is still moving. Binance co-CEO Richard Teng later said the attack was more complex than the misuse of a single engineer's permissions, and investigators have found additional points of entry.
Kaspersky's reading: two faces of one risk
"These two cases demonstrate fundamentally different intrusion methods: in one, the entry point was an employee's work device; in the other, a third-party web component," Kucherin said. His broader point is about people rather than code: "crypto-exchange employees, especially technical staff, remain one of the weak links in attacks aimed at stealing cryptocurrency." Kaspersky points to a case it handled in which a developer in the crypto sector installed a malicious coding-tool extension and about $500,000 was drained from their wallets.
The thread connecting a prediction market and the largest exchange, in Kaspersky's framing, is dependency. Both can be breached through things they do not directly control, whether that is a vendor's script or a laptop that leaves the office.
The attribution question nobody has closed
Early reports on the Binance theft named the Lazarus Group, the North Korea-linked hacking operation, and outside analysts including TRM Labs and Chainalysis tied the exploit to TraderTraitor, a cluster associated with the same state program. Kaspersky is more careful: it says Lazarus involvement in both the Binance and Polymarket incidents is unconfirmed while the investigations run. For scale, it set the episodes beside the 2016 attempt on Bangladesh's central bank, where attackers tried to steal $1 billion, and the roughly $1.5 billion Bybit hack in 2025.
The North Korea link remains a working theory, not a finding. For readers who track the regime itself rather than the forensics, the market prices longer-horizon questions about Pyongyang:
What changes for a Polymarket trader
The uncomfortable lesson is that money sitting in a wallet you control was still reachable, not because the market's contracts failed but because a script loaded in the browser could act with the logged-in session's authority. The refunds close the immediate hole. The exposure does not, because a prediction market's front end is a stack of third-party code, any piece of which can be turned against the user if the vendor behind it is compromised.
Kaspersky's split diagnosis leaves Polymarket with a problem the dollar totals understate: the drain entered through a vendor nobody at the company had reason to distrust, which means the platform is only as safe as the shortest list of outside scripts it is willing to load. Until that list gets shorter, the next hijack will not need to beat Polymarket's code either. It will just need another trusted script to ride in on.
